Biomedical Community and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention by Dando, Malcolm R. & Whitby, Simon M.
BMC News and Views (2001) 2:6BMC News and Views (2001) 2:6Editorial
The biomedical community and the biological and toxin weapons 
convention
Simon Whitby1 and Malcolm Dando2
Negotiations to find a legally binding way to strengthen
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
of 1972 [1]are in danger of failing. The crisis was precip-
itated during the current round of talks, now in its final
week in Geneva, when the US, alone amongst the negoti-
ating States, rejected the text of a protocol that has taken
six and a half years to negotiate.
The US argues that the measures in the text would not
prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and that
the measures intended to enable verification of compli-
ance with the Convention would not be successful. Al-
though the US remains committed to looking for new
ways to prevent proliferation and to enable verification,
failure to find agreement now could, given that arms ne-
gotiations traditionally extend over many years, lead to a
hiatus of five or more years at a dangerous time when bi-
omedicine is reaping the knowledge of the genomic rev-
olution. Such a failure would send out the wrong
message to those countries that intelligence reports sug-
gest are conducting programmes to develop biological
weapons.
The biomedical community obviously is focussed on the
health benefits of the new biomedicine, but is must play
a bigger role also in preventing the malign misuse of this
dual-use technology, because genomics opens up the
possibility of creating militarily significant weapons.
That is, advances in biomedicine mean that there is a real
possibility of designing weapons that are stable, reliable,
predictable, discriminating, fast acting, dispersible and
do not backfire on the user, and so have real potential as
tactical and strategic weapons.
Potential novel biological weapons include:
Benign microorganisms, genetically modified to produce
a toxin, venom sub fraction or endogenous bioregulator;
Microorganisms resistant to antibiotics, standard vac-
cines and therapeutics;
Microorganisms with enhanced aerosol and environ-
mental stability;
Immunologically altered micro organisms able to defeat
standard identification, detection and diagnostic meth-
ods; and 
Combinations of the above coupled with improved deliv-
ery systems.
To prevent proliferation of such weapons, the interna-
tional community pursues a range of policies. These are
referred to as a "web of deterrence" and they include:
 - An international prohibition regime;
 - Broad controls on the use and transfer of dangerous
pathogens;
 - Detection, protection and treatment measures; and
 - Determined international responses to any use or
threat of use of biological weapons.
Of these the international prohibition regime is the
lynchpin. It is based first on the 1925 Geneva Protocol
which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons.
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(BTWC) supplements the 1925 Protocol. Its scope is set
out in Article I which states that:
"Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in
any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or oth-
erwise acquire or retain:
1.Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever
their origin or method or production, of types and in
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes…"
Thus there is nothing wrong with the sweeping scope of
the Convention. The problem is that the BTWC was ne-
gotiated during the Cold War and no agreement could be
reached then on a mechanism to verify that the States
Parties were living up to their obligations.
Efforts were made in the 1980s to strengthen the BTWC
through voluntary annual data exchanges (Confidence
Building Measures) but these failed. So after the fears
that Iraq might have used biological weapons in the 1991
Gulf War more serious efforts began to find a legally
binding verification mechanism. These efforts started
with a two-year scientific and technical investigation of
potential verification mechanisms in the process that is
known as VEREX.
Amongst the wide range of measures assessed were cer-
tain elements such as sampling and identification on-site
and medical examination where biomedical science
could play a part. However, as the process of negotiation
amongst the 140 plus states got underway in earnest in
the later 1990s the role seen for such measures was much
reduced in relation to compliance as they were judged to
be too intrusive to be widely acceptable.
The compliance measures in the Protocol to the BTWC
now under negotiation are based on three strands:
 -Declarations by each State Party of the most relevant fa-
cilities;
 -Visits to check the validity of the declarations; and
 -Challenge inspection of both facilities and field when
there are well-founded suspicions of violations.
It is really only in relation to challenge inspections -
which are likely to be rare - that sampling may be used.
The inspections would be carried out by a professional
team trained by a yet to be established BTWC Organisa-
tion. These people would have a biomedical or engineer-
ing background and be subject to high levels of
confidentiality, thus ensuring that legitimate commer-
cial confidentiality and national security information
would be protected.
The indirect effect of cooperation
However, the BTWC also has a second aspect of the en-
couragement of cooperation in relevant technologies,
and here the potential role of biomedical sciences in
strengthening the Convention is much stronger. Whilst
advanced industrialised countries see the prohibition re-
gime as an overall enhancement to international security
because of its total prohibition against biological weap-
ons, developing countries have tended to see the regime
in terms of improvements in the flow of scientific and
technological exchange between north and south. It is
envisaged in the Protocol text that the biomedical science
community would engage in cooperative activities in the
following areas:
1. Sharing information on the peaceful use of biomedicine
Therefore, a future BTWC organisation might facilitate
greater cooperation between north and south in regard
to the collection and dissemination of information on the
peaceful used of biomedical technologies including bio-
technology. For example, greater cooperation in this area
will lead to further strengthening the existing interna-
tional initiatives such as the Biosafety Clearing House
Mechanism as established under Article 18 of the Con-
vention on Biodiversity.
2. Technology transfer
Further benefits will flow from greater cooperation be-
tween north and south on scientific, technical, environ-
mental and legal information on experience with the
environmental release of genetically modified organ-
isms. Greater transparency in these areas will bring ben-
efits to all countries involved.
3. Good manufacturing and laboratory practice
Risks to the BTWC will reduce as standards relating to
Good Manufacturing, and Good Laboratory practice in
pharmaceutical and medicinal production rise around
the world as a result of the harmonisation of internation-
al guidelines. The promotion of measures to assist all
countries to adopt national standards for GLP and GMP
would bring scientific, technological and economic ben-
efits to countries through enhanced trade whilst at the
same time contributing to increased confidence in com-
pliance with the regime that prohibits biological weap-
ons.
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Further to this, the harmonisation worldwide of stand-
ards relating to biological containment would result in
increased confidence that biological microorganisms are
being handled, stored, and used safely and for permitted
purposes. In addition to the provisions set out under the
BTWC, improved worldwide cooperation of safety in bi-
otechnology are being addressed in other international
fora. For example, signatories to the Convention on Bio-
diversity [2]have adopted the Cartagena Biosafety Proto-
col and the Technical Guidelines on Safety in
Biotechnology (relating to the safe handling, transfer
and use of living modified organisms resulting from bio-
technology) drawn up by the United Nations Environ-
mental Programme (UNEP)[3]. Implementation of such
guidelines has obvious implications for biomedical com-
munities, and greater cooperation in these and other ar-
eas related to safety in biotechnology will increase
confidence that signatories to the BTWC are in compli-
ance with its terms.
5. Databases
Scientific and technical cooperation including coopera-
tion in biotechnology would be further enhanced under a
strengthened BTWC through the facilitation of access to
databases containing information on the peaceful uses of
biological agents and toxins, biosafety, and the results of
scientific research in the life sciences.
6. Emerging diseases
Indeed, improvements in the collection and dissemina-
tion of information on the diagnosis, surveillance, detec-
tion, treatment and prevention of diseases caused by
biological agents or toxins, particularly infectious diseas-
es as envisaged under a strengthened BTWC prohibition
regime would have far reaching implications for biomed-
ical communities. Steps are already being taken by the
WHO[4], the Office International des Epizooties
(OIE)[5] and the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO)[6] to develop strategies to
strengthen the infrastructure for disease surveillance
and to encourage research to develop new and effective
disease surveillance and controls of relevance to diseases
affecting humans, animals and plants. The implementa-
tion of improved measures in the above fields are of di-
rect relevance to the BTWC.
7. Handling and transport of biological agents
Furthermore, steps to harmonise national, regional and
international controls and regulations relating to the
handling, transportation, use and release of biological
agents and toxins will increase confidence that States are
in compliance with the BTWC.
 The need for the BTWC
In the last decades of the 20th Century, the former Soviet
Union, Iraq and South Africa had offensive biological
warfare programmes. In the 1990s the US Congress Of-
fice of Technology Assessment stated that seven other
countries were generally reported as having undeclared
offensive biological weapons programmes. Closing down
such programmes, and preventing their further prolifer-
ation, is an important goal for the international commu-
nity as has frequently been made clear in high-level
official statements.
Conclusions
A protocol strengthening compliance with the 1972
BTWC signed by those countries, particularly those such
as the US that are leading opponents to the development
of biological weapons and leaders in biomedicine, will do
much to create an international environment hostile to
the proliferation of biological weapons. 
The Protocol’s specific provisions, coupled with those of
other elements of "the web of deterrence" aim to:
Make it more difficult for "proliferation governments"
and sub-national groups to gain access to the materials
needed for biological weapons programmes;
To build confidence among nations that signatories are
complying with the terms of the BTWC; and
To make joining the BTWC a viable and attractive option
for emerging economies.
The biomedical community has a role to play in further-
ing these aims. Yet, one of the major problems during the
past decade when exploring ways to strengthen the
BTWC has been the lack of interest and understanding
amongst specialist and general publics of the growing
dangers of biological warfare and the need for greater ef-
forts to prevent such a dreadful deliberate use of disease
as a weapon of war and terror. 
Perhaps the greatest contribution that biomedical sci-
ence can make to verification of the BTWC is to take an
informed interest in the efforts of the international com-
munity and to use their undoubted standing and prestige
to support the drive for an effective conclusion of a veri-
fication Protocol.
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